Front Matter
This Investor Memorandum (the “Memorandum”) is being provided for public informational purposes only. It is not an offering document and should not be construed as a solicitation to buy or sell securities issued by GPO Plus, Inc. (the “Company”). Any decision regarding the Company’s securities should be made only after careful review of the Company’s SEC filings on EDGAR, OTC Markets materials where applicable, and independent due diligence by the reader and the reader’s legal, financial, and tax advisors.
This Memorandum contains forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements include, without limitation, statements regarding projected revenue, projected revenue per store, projected gross margin, store count targets, the timing of expected milestones, the size, structure, timing, manner, and pricing of any future capital raise, capital deployment plans, expected use of proceeds, any acquisition strategy, the performance and commercialization of PRISM+ and other technology developed by GPOXLabs, the Company’s competitive position, and any statement that does not relate solely to historical or current fact. Words such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” “would,” “expects,” “plans,” “anticipates,” “believes,” “estimates,” “projects,” “predicts,” “intends,” “targets,” “potential,” “path to,” “run rate,” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements, but their absence does not mean a statement is not forward-looking.
The safe harbor provisions for forward-looking statements under Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, are not available to the Company because the Company is an issuer of penny stock as that term is defined in Rule 3a51-1 under the Exchange Act. Investors should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statement in this Memorandum and should evaluate any forward-looking statement only in the context of the cautionary factors described below and the Company’s risk-related disclosures, cautionary statements, MD&A, financial statements, notes to financial statements, liquidity disclosures, and other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Specific factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from any forward-looking statement include, without limitation: (i) the going concern qualification in the Company’s most recent audited financial statements and the substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern; (ii) the Company’s recurring net losses, working capital deficit, and cumulative deficit of approximately $45.8 million as of January 31, 2026, and cash on hand of approximately $17,897 as of that date; (iii) the Company’s significant customer concentration, including reliance on one customer for approximately 92% of total revenue for the nine months ended January 31, 2026, and approximately 72% of accounts receivable as of that date; (iv) the Company’s need for substantial additional capital to execute its operating plan, the absence of any committed source of such capital, and the likelihood that any future capital raise will be dilutive to existing shareholders; (v) execution risk in scaling store count, per-store revenue, and operating leverage; (vi) competitive dynamics in the direct store delivery and convenience distribution industry, including from larger and better-capitalized competitors; (vii) regulatory changes affecting specialty product categories, including Other Tobacco Products, nicotine accessories, hemp/CBD products, and emerging wellness categories; (viii) the availability of qualified drivers, warehouse personnel, and key personnel, and the concentration of operational knowledge in a small number of individuals; (ix) the development, deployment, and commercialization of PRISM+ and other technology, including risks that platforms in internal alpha or beta deployment do not perform as expected when scaled; (x) the concentration of voting control in the holder of the Company’s Series A Preferred Stock; (xi) integration risks associated with any acquisition the Company may pursue; (xii) the Company’s status as a penny stock issuer and OTCQB-listed company, including limited liquidity, limited analyst coverage, and price volatility; (xiii) general economic, financial market, and geopolitical conditions; and (xiv) the additional risk factors disclosed in the Company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this Memorandum. The Company undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as required by applicable law.
Front Matter
This Memorandum is being furnished, not filed, as an exhibit to the Company’s Current Report on Form 8-K under Item 7.01 (Regulation FD Disclosure). The information in this Memorandum shall not be deemed to be “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liabilities of that section, nor shall it be deemed incorporated by reference into any registration statement or other filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, except as expressly set forth by specific reference in such filing.
Financial data referenced herein is derived from the Company’s SEC filings available on EDGAR, OTC Markets materials where applicable, internal management records, and publicly available industry data from various sources, including NACS, Circana, and other industry bodies. Management estimates, run-rate figures, and projections are identified as such throughout this document and should be distinguished from audited historical results. The fiscal year ended April 30, 2025, audited revenue figure of approximately $4.744 million and audited gross margin of approximately 23.85% are reported results. The $6.4 million annualized run rate estimated as of April 2026.
The Company’s independent registered public accounting firm has issued a going concern qualification in connection with the Company’s most recent audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2025, as filed in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K. The Company has incurred recurring operating losses since inception, has a working capital deficit, and has not yet established an ongoing source of revenue sufficient to cover its operating costs. As of January 31, 2026, the Company had a cumulative deficit of approximately $45.8 million and cash on hand of approximately $17,897. These conditions raise substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time. Investors should read this Memorandum in light of the going concern qualification and the Company’s most recent Form 10-K and Form 10-Q in their entirety. Statements in this Memorandum regarding the Company’s operating model, growth strategy, and capital plan should not be read to qualify, modify, or supersede the going concern disclosure in the Company’s public filings.
The Company has significant customer concentration. As reported in the Company’s most recent Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended January 31, 2026, one customer accounted for approximately 92% of the Company’s total revenue for the nine months ended January 31, 2026, and approximately 72% of the Company’s accounts receivable as of that date. References in this Memorandum to active stores, store count, or revenue per store should be read in the context of this concentration. The loss of, or any material reduction in revenue from, this customer would have a material adverse effect on the Company’s revenue, operating results, and ability to execute its capital plan.
The Company has reported recurring net losses. Net loss for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2025 was approximately $4.34 million, compared to a net loss of approximately $4.94 million for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2024. Net loss for the nine months ended January 31, 2026 was approximately $2.02 million, compared to approximately $1.58 million for the nine months ended January 31, 2025. The Company’s ability to achieve and sustain profitability is dependent on its ability to scale revenue, manage operating costs, and secure sufficient capital. There is no assurance that the Company will achieve profitability.
References in this Memorandum to a capital plan, capital strategy, capitalization plan, total capital need, tranches, or any specific dollar amount of capital are forward-looking and reflect management’s current view of the capital required to execute the Company’s operating plan. The Company has not determined the structure, timing, manner, pricing, or terms of any future offering of securities. No offering of securities is being conducted in connection with this Memorandum. This Memorandum is not, and should not be construed as, an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security issued by the Company. Any future offering of securities by the Company, if pursued, will be conducted only through documents specific to that offering and only after registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or pursuant to an applicable exemption from registration. The Company will require additional capital to execute its operating plan; there is no assurance that such capital will be available on acceptable terms, or at all, and any future capital raise is likely to result in dilution to existing shareholders.
The Company’s audited financial statements, risk-related disclosures, cautionary statements, MD&A, financial statements, notes, and other public disclosures are available in the Company’s SEC filings at www.sec.gov and through the Company’s investor relations page at www.GPOPlus.com.
Letter from the CEO
To Our Shareholders and Any Interested Parties:
Thank you for taking the time to read this Memorandum. I want to begin plainly. GPO Plus was not built from a position of abundance. It was built under pressure, through constant adaptation, and by learning this business in the field, service appointment by service appointment, store by store, route by route, and decision by decision.
When we went public on May 5, 2020, we were a Group Purchasing Organization (“GPO”) as the world was entering COVID. We did what we had to do to survive, including operating in categories that were relevant to that moment. When the easier path would have been to stay in those categories, I made the decision to return to what I believed the company could become over the long term: a real distribution platform serving a fragmented part of the convenience channel that larger incumbents do not serve well.
In December 2022, we acquired Betterment Retail Solutions, a Direct Store Delivery company. What we bought was not a finished company. We bought shelf access, route relationships, and roughly 500 stores that needed to be rebuilt from the inside. Over the next three years, we renegotiated vendors, rebuilt pricing, improved merchandising, strengthened compliance, tightened hiring, developed technology, refined warehouse flow, and turned that footprint into a model we believe is now proven. Revenue per store moved from roughly $180 per month to approximately $1,000 per month. Gross margins moved from roughly 15% to approximately 28%. Management believes the model has been operationally validated by three years of operating data. The acquisition was not a turnkey platform; it was a starting footprint. The value creation came from converting that footprint into a standardized, technology-supported, margin-improved operating model.
I have personally supported this business through working capital constraints and continue to do so because I believe deeply in what has been built. This is not a story about a concept that still needs to be discovered. It is a story about a business that now needs capital to utilize the infrastructure, relationships, operating knowledge, and technology already in place.
“Direct Store Delivery has not meaningfully evolved in over 100 years. We saw a generational opportunity.”
The near-term objective is clear: move from approximately 500 stores to 1,000 active stores generating roughly $1,000 per store per month, which management believes is the threshold for cash flow positive operations. Beyond that, the opportunity is to scale toward 5,000 stores at approximately $2,000 per store per month by expanding categories, deepening retailer relationships, and pursuing disciplined acquisitions in a fragmented market.
This Memorandum is designed to show you what we have built, what we have learned, and where the risks remain. I appreciate your time, your candor, and your diligence.
Investor Tearsheet · Central Question
The central question is not whether the model works. Three years of operating data across hundreds of store locations, multiple geographies, and evolving product categories have answered that question. The central question is how much value can be created when a now-proven operating system is capitalized and scaled at the right pace. The judgment before prospective investors is whether GPOX can capitalize and scale this model faster than competitors can replicate it. Management believes the infrastructure, technology, operating data, and team are now in place to do exactly that.
Why Now
The timing of this public update reflects management's view that the Company has accumulated additional operating experience. Management made a deliberate decision to begin communicating to the investment community after the model was proven rather than before. The timing of this update follows three years of operational evidence, audited financial performance, and the demonstrated ability to improve margin, increase revenue per store, and expand the distribution network under capital constraints.
Three years of operational adversity, vendor setbacks, regulatory shocks, hiring mistakes, and capital constraints have produced something that is genuinely difficult to replicate: a distribution network with real stores, real product flow, real data, and real operating margins that have improved continuously throughout that period.
De-risked. Documented across hundreds of operating stores.
De-risked. Multi-hub network operational and proven.
De-risked. Internal alpha deployment actively improving operations.
De-risked. Vendor-specific negotiations ongoing in place.
De-risked. Over-compliance posture post-2023 regulatory events.
De-risked. Driver accountability via photo documentation.
De-risked. Team expanded beyond founder-dependency.
Remains to be proven. Execution task – not discovery task.
Remains to be proven. Addressed in capital deployment plan.
Optional update. Not required for base investment thesis.
Contents
Retail Investor Version · condensed from the full GPOX Investor Memorandum.
Part 01 · The Investment Thesis
GPO Plus (OTCQB: GPOX) is a technology-driven Direct Store Delivery distribution company serving gas stations, convenience stores, and specialty retailers across the Southwest and Midwest. It combines physical infrastructure, the proprietary PRISM+ platform, and an in-house innovation division, GPOXLabs, to serve a slice of the convenience channel that legacy distributors have structurally underserved. The building, testing, and de-risking is done. What the Company requires now is capital to deploy what already exists.
Revenue per store, margins, route efficiency, and sustained weekly service across a broad footprint — reported operational results, not projections. Average monthly revenue per store grew from ~$180 to ~$1,000 since the Betterment acquisition; gross margins expanded from ~15% to ~28%.
De-risked across 500+ storesAbout $5 million has been invested in a network designed to support a business forty times current scale. Regional Hubs, Mini Hubs, a dedicated fleet, PRISM+, SOPs, and driver-accountability systems are in place today. Each new store is served by infrastructure already paid for.
Capacity for 20,000 storesManagement has been explicit across three years of public reporting: capital availability is the primary constraint, not the model, not the market, not the team. The stores are available; the system is built.
$45M / 3-yr planPart 01 · Continued
The central question is not whether the model works; three years of operating data across hundreds of stores answered that. It is how much value can be created when a now-proven operating system is capitalized and scaled at the right pace.
Part 02 · Company Overview
GPO Plus went public on May 5, 2020, at the onset of COVID, pivoting to test kits and PPE to survive, then deliberately exiting those categories to return to distribution. That choice set the company’s operating principle: prioritize long-term position over short-term convenience.
Formed in Nevada; trading on OTC Markets since May 2020. Early COVID-era categories were exited on purpose, despite their revenue, to rebuild around a durable distribution platform serving the convenience channel.
In December 2022 GPOX acquired Betterment Retail Solutions, a Lubbock, TX direct-store-delivery distributor. What it bought was premium register-side shelf space in ~500 stores across nine states, plus retailer relationships. What it lacked: capital, technology, leadership depth, and a scalable operating system.
A full-service DSD distributor: drivers visit on a weekly schedule, replenish to velocity, maintain planograms, and capture store-level data. Route operations are no longer run day-to-day by the CEO; the business runs on systems and a leadership team that didn’t exist at acquisition. That operational independence is a structural milestone.
Network monthly revenue
across the store baseRevenue / store / month
5.5× per storeGross margin
blended demonstratedOperating system
13+ tools consolidatedPart 03 · Market Opportunity
The gas-station and convenience channel is one of the most durable, traffic-dense formats in retail: massive, non-discretionary, and recession-resistant. It is structurally dependent on reliable weekly supply — exactly the economics a DSD distributor improves with each recurring visit.
Private label is ~$330B in annual U.S. sales and 24% of unit share, with Gen Z driving record adoption (Circana). Convenience has lagged for lack of distribution infrastructure; GPOX’s end-to-end private-label capability sits directly at that intersection — and it is one of its highest-margin categories.
Under SBT, vendors retain ownership until point-of-sale scan, reducing retailer risk and aligning incentives around sell-through. SBT is expanding across the channel, and PRISM+ was built to natively support its real-time data, reporting, and reconciliation.
Part 04 · Business Model
GPOX runs a full-service Direct Store Delivery model: a simple, repeatable weekly cycle. The company functions as the retailer’s outsourced warehouse, merchandiser, and data provider, creating a level of operational dependency that infrequent competitors cannot replicate.
Company drivers service most stores on a recurring weekly schedule.
Restock in store-specific quantities calibrated to actual sales, not blunt minimum-order quantities.
Before-and-after shelf photos maintain planogram integrity at every visit.
Purchase orders are created in real time on the driver’s mobile device.
Every visit closes with a digital signature from the store manager.
The primary source: products sourced at negotiated vendor pricing and sold into the channel at a margin. Buy at scale, deliver efficiently, capture the spread.
Private-label and own-brand goods in select categories carry a structural margin advantage; GPOX manages the full chain from manufacturing to weekly delivery.
In certain relationships GPOX charges a white-glove service fee independent of product margin, and earns warehousing fees within its hub network.
Part 05 · Unit Economics
Unit economics are the most important section of this Memorandum, and the primary reason management believes the business has moved from discovery to deployable scale. The figures are driven by observed performance across hundreds of stores, not by modeling assumptions.
Top stores already clear $5,000+/mo (under 2% of stores each month). Solid = actual; outlined = management target (forward-looking).
Inflection
1,000 active stores at ~$1,000 / store / month → ~$12M annualized, the threshold management identifies for cash-flow-positive operations. The infrastructure to serve 1,000 stores is already substantially in place.
Part 06 · PRISM+ + GPOXLabs
PRISM+ is GPOX’s proprietary, AI-powered distribution and operations platform, built by GPOXLabs to consolidate 13+ separate tools into one. It is in internal alpha for driver-facing operations: functional, actively improving, and honestly described as a platform under development, not a finished product.
The mobile app captures GPS location, timestamped service windows, before-and-after planogram photos, and mandatory digital manager sign-off, proving compliance and supporting revenue recognition under SBT.
Every weekly visit generates SKU-level velocity, inventory behavior, and ordering patterns. The dataset grows more valuable with each store and each week.
GPOXLabs applies artificial intelligence across three areas of the operation (route, inventory, and commercial) under one discipline: connect every technology decision to a specific operational outcome, never technology for its own sake.
How to read it
PRISM+ and GPOXLabs are the second value pillar: upside optionality that compounds the physical network. The base case requires neither commercialization nor Labs revenue. Investors get a proven DSD platform with a proprietary technology stack at a price that currently reflects neither.
Part 07 · Competitive Position
GPOX’s advantage is not a single feature; it is the accumulation of infrastructure, relationships, speed, and data that took three years and ~$5M to build, and that capital alone cannot shortcut.
~$5M in hub-and-spoke network, fleet, SOPs, and PRISM+. A well-capitalized new entrant would need 18–24 months of operational construction to reach GPOX’s route efficiency and data depth.
18–24 mo. to replicateDrivers visit the same stores on the same schedule every week. Over 24–36 months that becomes a retention mechanism price alone can’t overcome. ~500 relationships carry three years of service history.
24–36 mo. of trustGPOX onboards new categories in weeks, not quarters. A new product reaches the full active store base within a single weekly service cycle once a category decision is made.
Weeks, not quartersEvery visit generates data. At 500 stores it’s an operational tool; at 5,000 it becomes a category-intelligence asset vendors and manufacturers can access through no other channel.
Compounds with scalePart 08 · Financial Performance
The revenue trajectory since the Betterment acquisition is the clearest single proof point for the thesis: ~6× growth achieved under capital constraints that limited the pace of store additions. The distinction between audited revenue and management-estimated run-rate is preserved throughout.
Solid = actual / audited; outlined = management target (forward-looking). Log-spaced.
The path
The path to cash-flow-positive runs through 1,000 active stores at ~$1,000/month (~$12M annualized) and does not require new geographies. Existing hubs have capacity; reaching 1,000 stores is primarily an execution challenge: drivers, sales team, and working capital.
Part 09 · Leadership
The leadership team has been built to scale the business beyond founder-led operations. DSD distribution operations are no longer managed day-to-day by the CEO. Each functional area has dedicated leadership with relevant industry experience.
20+ years in capital markets; U.S. Army veteran. Has personally funded company expenses during early growth. Leads capital allocation, investor relations, and public-company stewardship.
Background at TD Bank, BMO, and Deloitte. Leads executive operations and strategic coordination as a direct extension of the CEO.
15+ years at Duluth Trading and Orvis. Led merchandising and category strategy behind the audited gross-margin expansion.
Statistician by training. Leads PRISM+ architecture, systems integration, and data analytics.
Founder-minded operator, 20+ years scaling tech companies across advertising, SaaS, and fintech.
25+ years in operations management. Leads warehouse operations, logistics, and process design.
Hands-on digital marketing leader focused on translating strategy into measurable execution.
Attorney and investment banker with deep capital-markets expertise. Advises on legal, capital markets, and M&A.
Part 10 · Risk Factors & Forward Outlook
A 100-year-old Direct Store Delivery model, rebuilt from the route up on owned hub-and-spoke infrastructure built ahead of demand, with capacity for 20,000+ stores. The path to cash-flow-positive is concrete: scale from roughly 500 to 1,000 active stores at about $1,000 per store per month. The model is proven and the infrastructure is built; capital is the only remaining constraint.
The Company’s independent registered public accounting firm has issued a going concern qualification for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2025. The Company has incurred recurring operating losses since inception, has a working-capital deficit, and has not yet established an ongoing source of revenue sufficient to cover operating costs. As of January 31, 2026, the cumulative deficit was approximately $45.8 million and cash on hand approximately $17,897.
As reported in the most recent Form 10-Q, one customer accounted for approximately 92% of total revenue for the nine months ended January 31, 2026, and approximately 72% of accounts receivable. The loss of, or any material reduction in revenue from, this customer would have a material adverse effect on revenue, operating results, and the ability to execute the capital plan.
Net loss for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2025 was approximately $4.34 million, compared with $4.94 million for fiscal 2024. Achieving and sustaining profitability depends on scaling revenue, managing operating costs, and securing sufficient capital. There is no assurance the Company will achieve profitability.
References to a capital plan or specific dollar amount are forward-looking; no offering of securities is being conducted in connection with this Memorandum. Financial data is derived from SEC filings on EDGAR, OTC Markets materials, internal management records, and industry data (NACS, Circana). Audited FY2025 revenue was ~$4.744M at a 23.85% gross margin. Full disclosures are available at sec.gov and GPOPlus.com.
Part 10 · Risk Factors & Forward Outlook
Each risk below carries a named mitigant. Their existence does not invalidate the thesis; the question is whether the mitigants are sufficient and the risk-adjusted return compelling.
Recurring losses, a working-capital deficit, ~$17,897 cash and a ~$45.8M cumulative deficit as of Jan 31, 2026.
One customer was ~92% of revenue for the nine months ended Jan 31, 2026, and ~72% of receivables.
Substantial additional capital is required; any equity financing is likely dilutive and debt may carry restrictive covenants.
Converting capital into sustained store additions and per-store productivity requires consistent execution across a larger team.
A $341.2B channel where a fragmented ~$50B+ segment is underserved by legacy distributors. GPOX is among the few technology-driven, compliance-oriented weekly DSD operators with three years of history, documented unit economics, and a proprietary platform built for the segment.
Cash-flow-positive runs through 1,000 stores (~$12M annualized) from ~500 today; the larger case is 5,000 stores (~$120M annualized), against a current OTCQB market capitalization of ~$6.36M.
Management believes the demonstrated model, available infrastructure, assembled team, and $50B+ opportunity support the thesis. Investors should conduct their own independent evaluation and consult their advisors.